Master Auto Service Corporation v. Cledious M. Bowden by unknown
't 
I 
I I , 
Record No. 2509 
In the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
at Richmond 
MASTER AUTO SERVICE CORPORATION 
v. 
CLEDIOUS M. BOWDEN 
F ROM THE CIRCUIT COl'RT OF T U E CITY OF N OBJ<'OLK. 
RULE 14. 
; 
~5. N U MBER OF C OPIES TO BE FILED .A.ND DELIVERED TO 0PPOS· 
ING CouN"SBL. '.l.1wenty cop ies of each brief shall be filed with 
the clerk of ihe court, and at least two copies mailed or de, 
livered to opposing counsel on or before the day on which tho 
brief is filed. 
ff6. S 1zE AN D T YPE. Briefs shall be printed in type not less 
in size than small pica, and shall be nine inches in length 
nnd six inches in width , so a s to rouform in climensicns to 
the printetl records. The record number of the case shall he 
printed on all brief s. 
The for egoing i:s p rinted in small pica type fo r fo e informa-
l ion of cmmscl. 
1\L B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Court opens at 9 :30 a. m. ; Adjourns at 1 :00 p. m. 
C L-~ flt-< 
SUPRE\'fi[ coum Or ~pp£A\.S, 
n'V;:. 0 £ \V:E 




INDEX TO PETITION 
(Record No. 2509) 
Page 
I. STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2* 
1. The Job . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2..., 
2. The Errand of Mercy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3lll' 
3. The Accident . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . 4i1> 
4. Geography of the Deviation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 e 
5. Narrative of the Trial ........................ 1. • • • • • 5* 
II. ASSIGNMENTS1 OF ERROR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5u 
III. ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7* 
1. The Defendant Is Not Liable Because the Negligent Act 
of Defendant's Driver Was His Own Personal Act Beyond 
the Scope of His Employment and Beyond the Zone of 
His Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7:'J,. 
2. The Fact That DefendaJJ.t's Driver Was Returning from 
His Deviation When the Accident Occurred Did Not 
Bring His Negligent Act Within the Scope of His Em-
ployment . . . . . ,, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10° 
(a) The Out of State Decisions ..................... 10~ 
(b) The Virginia Decisions ......................... 149 
3. The Fact Tha.t the Customer's Tire Was in the Defend-
ant's Truck When the Accident Occurred Has No Bear-
ing or Effect Upon the Defendants Liability ........... 16* 
IV. CONCLUSION: The Judgment of the Trial Court Should 
Be Reversed and Judgment Should Be Entered for De-
fendant ...................................... · ... 18* 
Table of Citations 
Allen v. Ross, 1.38 S. W. (2) ...................... 13*, 17f; 
Appalachian Power Co. v. Robertson, 142 Va. 454 & 1.29 
S. E. 224... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8* 
Barnes v. Hampton.,, 149 Va. 740 & 141 S. E. 836 ....... 8*\ 14~' 
Blashfield Cyc. of Automobile Law and Practice, p. 212, 
Sec. 3051 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 :i.!' 
42 Corpus Juris, page 1112, Sec. 871. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 * 
Curry v. Bickley (Iowa), 195 N. ·w. 617, 618 ........... 12* 
Danforth v. Fisher, 71 A. 535 ..................... 14\ 15* 
Dawson Chevrolet Co. v. Ford. 170 S. E. 306. . . . . . . . . . 13* 
Goitsse v. Lowe, 183 P. 295, 296 ....................... 11 * 
INDEX TO PETITION-Continued 
Page 
Graves v. Utica Candy Co., 204 N. Y. S. 682. . . . . . . . . . . . 13* 
Humphrey v. Ho,gan, 104 S. W. (2) 767 ............. 11 *, 17'* 
Kavcvnau,.q'hv. Wheeling, 175 Va.105, 7 S. E. (2) 125 .. 7*, 8«' 
Kidd v. DeWitt, 128 Va. 438 & 105 S. E. 124 ......... 8*, 15* 
Model Laitndry Co. v. Collins, 43 S. "\V. (2) 6H3 ..... 13*, 17* 
Patterso1i v. Kates, 152 F. 481. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15• 
Peters v. Pi11ia Mercantile Co., 2H P. (2) 143 ........ 12*, 17* 
Ruff v. Pa.rle;t1 Machine ·works, 99 P. (2) .............. 13* 
Salt cs v. Affleck, 102 P. (2) 493. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.:, 
She/ts v. Free, 146 Atl. 185 .......................... 13* 
Southwest Dairy Products Co. v. DeFrates, 125 S. "\V. (2) 
292 ............................................ 12«· 
Svrlnor <.fl; Iiundle.11 v. Bonifant, 158 Va. 703 & 164 S. ~j. 
403 ............................................ 16* 
Usher v. Stafford, 288 N. W. 432 ...................... 13* 
Va. lr.e <.fl; Fr. Corv. v. Coffin, 166 Va. 154 & 184 S. E. 
214 ......................................... 8*, 14* 
Western. Union v. Phelps, 1.60 Va. 674 & 169 S. E. 574.... 8* 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2509 
MASTER AUTO SERVICE CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff in Error, Defendant Below, 
vers·us 
OLEDIOUS l\L BOWDEN, Defendant in Error, Plaintiff' 
Belo·w. 
From, the Circu-it Coiirt of the City of Norfolk. 
MASTER AUTO SERVICE CORPORATION'S PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the II onora.ble Justices of the Su,prem.e Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
The petitioner is ag·grieved by a judgment of the Circuit 
Court of the City of Norfolk, Virgfoia, in the above entitled 
cause, said judgment being entered on June 23, 1941, against 
the petitioner, wherein the Court overruled the petitioner's 
motion for a new trial and entered judgment in favor of the 
defendant in error (plaintiff below) against the petitioner 
for the sum of $3,500.00, with interest from May 20, 1941, 
and costs. 
* A transcript of the record is herewith filed, accom-
panied by three original exhibits designated "Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 1-Hospital Bill", "Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2-
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Small Plat", and ''Defendant's Exhibit No. 1-.Service 
Sheet''. Said exhibits are duly certified, as appears at page 
57 of the record. 
For the sake of convenience and clarity, the parties will 
be referred to as plaintiff and defendant, as per their status 
in the trial court, the petitioner or plaintiff in error having 
been the defendant below, and the defendant in error having 
been the plaintiff below. 
I. STATEMENT 
1. The Job 
The defendant operates an extensive automobile supply 
service and repair system in the City of Norfolk, with its 
main plant at the northeast corner of Colonial Avenue and 
Twentieth Street. 
On the afternoon of April 6, 1940, one of the defendant's 
drivers and service men, a colored man named Levi Powell, 
was despatched with one of defendant's trucks to the plant 
of one of defendant's customers, Transit Mixed Concrete Cor-
poration, located on the north side of York Street, just east 
of the York Street bridge to that section of Norfolk known 
as "Atlantic City". Powell was to get a damaged tire from 
the customer and transport it to the defendant's plant at 
Colonial Avenue and Twentieth Street for repairs. After re-
moving· the tire and loading· it into the truck Powell started 
back to the plant. 
•2. The Errand of Mercy 
Powell's testimony is that after he had proceeded only one 
short block, and was about to turn north into Botetourt Street 
from York Street, he was accosted at that corner by a negro 
man who was a. stranger to him. According to Powell, tbe 
man '' said he had had a hemorrhage from his nose and he 
was sick. He asked me if I would take him across town, and 
I told him I would, and I taken him. '"' f.« * He said he was sick 
and suffered from hemorrhage and would I take him acro~s 
town, and I told him I would, and that is what I did'' (R., 
p. 33). 
Powell testified that if Im had not undertaken this errand 
of mercv he would have turned north into Botetourt Street 
and tra~eled across tl1e Botetourt Street bridg·e to Mowbray 
Arch; that he would have turned left into :Mowbray Arch 
after crossing the bridge and proceeded one block to Colonifl l 
Avenue; and finally that he would have then turned north 
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into Colonial Avenue and proceeded north on -Colonial Ave-
nue to the plant at Twentieth Street (R., p. 31). As it was, 
he continued east on York, instead of turning north into Bote-
tourt, after picking up the stranger, and then drove from the 
western part of the City, wherein were situated the plants 
of the defendant and the defendant's customer, over to the 
eastern part of the City and the negro section east of Church 
Street. It does not appear from the evidence exactly what 
streets were used in getting from the corner of York and 
Botetourt O'\:er to the negro section, but the furthest point 
east reached by Powell and his passenger was the corner of 
Chapel Street and Princess Arme Road. The passenger asked 
to be put out at a drug store at this corner, and stated 
4• that this place was only a block from *his home. He 
alig·hted from the truck at this drug store, and thereafter 
departed entirely from the scene so far as this case is con-
cerned. He was never afterwards found or identified. 
3. The Accident 
Powell testified that after discharging his passenger he 
turned around and started west on Princess Anne Road to get 
back to his route. When he had proceeded less than two blocks 
at a moderate speed a car left the curb, got in front of him 
and forced him to swerve to the left. ·when his truck was 
thus forced to the left side of the street he found himself con .. 
fronted by traffic from the other direction. To avoid a head-on 
collision he ran still further left on to the sidewalk, where 
the plaintiff and several others were injured by his truck. 
He denies that he was in fault, but that question was sub-
mitted to the jury, who found for the plaintiff as aforesaid. 
Under these circumstances it has to be conceded for the pur-
pose of this review that Powell's negligence stands estab-
lished. After the aooident Powell was arrested and never 
completed his trip back to the route and zone of employment 
from which he had departed. 
4. Geography of the Deviation 
As a frontispiece to this petition we have inserted a map 
of that portion of Norfolk City in which this affair was en-
acted. This map is a section of McIntyre's Norfolk City 
Atlas, on which we have had Mr. McIntyre mark certain fea-
tures that figure in this case. As appears from the legend 
5* *on the map, the scale is l ,200 feet to the inch, and the 
compass directions are indicated by the arrow above the 
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legend. The encircled letter "P'' indicates the position of 
the defendant's plant. The letter '' C'' indicates the position 
of the plant of the customer, Transit Mixed Concrete Cor-
poration. The heavy line on the map indicates the normal 
route between. the customer and the plant as testified to by 
Powell at page 31 of the record. The bridge where this route-
crosses Smith ·creek is indicated on the map. 'l,lie encircled 
letter '' D '' indicates where Powell departed from his regu-
lar route, following York Street eastward. The letter '' T'' 
indicates where he turned after discharging the passenger at 
the corner of Chapel Street and Princess Anne Road, the 
easternmost north and south street on the ma.p being Chapel 
Street. The letter "A" indicates the point of accident. 
After the accident Powell drove Mr. Lyle of the defend-
ant company over the route of his detour, and Mr. Lyle meas-
ured the distances by speedometer. At page 46 of the record 
he testifies that the distance where Powell departed from his 
route at "D'' to the point of accident at "A" was 1.8 miles; 
and that the distance from the point of accident along Prin-
cess Anne Road to the nearest point on the regular route was 
1.2 miles, or seventeen City blocks. 
5. Narrative of the Trial 
This case was tried before Judge A. R. Hanckel and a jury 
on May 20, 1941. At the close of plaintiff's evidence defend-
ant moved to strike the evidence on the ground that it ap-
peared on the face thereof that the act of defendant ,.s driver 
was beyond the scope of this authority. Judge Hanckel over-
ruled this motion and defendant excepted. The def end-
6* ant then adduced its *evidence, at the close of which a 
like motion to strike was made with the same result. On 
the evidence and certain instructions the case then went to 
the jury. Under defendant's instruction '' C '' the neg·ligence 
of defendant's driver was submitted to the jury, and the 
jury's verdict for the plaintiff established such neglig·ence 
for the purpose of this review. The defendant objected and 
excepted to all of the instructions granted at the instance 
of the plaintiff, basing its objections on the same ground 
lvhich had been urged in support of its two motions to strike 
the evidence, and taking the position that because it appeared 
from the evidence that the act of defendant's driver was be.-
yond the scope of his employment there was nothing to be 
submitted to the jury and none of plaintiff's instructiorn; 
should be given. Upon the same theory the defendant re-
quested and excepted to the refusal by the court of its in-
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struction designated "D''. These instructions are found in 
the record between pages 51 and 56, inclusive. 
When the jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff, the 
defendant moved to set the verdict aside as contrary to the 
law and the evidence, and because of the related actions of 
the court to which the defendant had excepted. The motion 
to set aside the verdict was argued on ,June 23, 1941. Judge 
Haneke! adhered to his former rulings, permitted the verdict 
to stand and entered thereon the judgment order from which 
a writ of error is now sought. This judgment order is found 
in the record at page 6. 
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. The court erred in overruling the defendant's motion 
to strike the evidence made at the close of plaintiff's evi-
dence. 
r~ •2. The court erred in overruling the defendant's mo-
tion to strike the evidence made at the close of all the 
evidence. 
3. The court erred in granting- at the instance of the plain-
tiff the instructions designated "P-1", "P-2'' and "P-3n. · 
4. The court erred in refusing the instruction designated 
"D ", as requested by the defendant. 
5. The court erred in overruling· the defendant's motion to 
set aside the verdict of the jury and in entering judgment 
for the plaintiff thereon. 
III. ARGUMENT 
1. The Defendant Is Not Liable Because the Negligent Act of De-
fendant's Driver Was His Own Personal Act Beyond the Scope 
of His Employment and Beyond the Zone of His Employment. 
There is presented in this case no complicated issue. The 
sole question in this review is the question whether the trial 
court was right or wrong in leaving it to the jury to deter-
mine whether or not the act of the defendant's driver wa~ 
within the scope of his employment, or whether the court 
should have passed upon that question as a matter of law. 
Perhaps no other state in the Union has more consistently 
and definitely rejected the idea of liability on the employer 
in the so-called deviation cases than has Virginia. Generally·, 
the word ''deviation'' as applied to these cases relates pri-
marily to a geographical deviation; but in Virginia it con-
notes as much a deviation in subject matter as a deviation 
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in place. Thus the case of Kavanaugh v. Wheeling, 175 Va. 
105, 7 S. E. (2), 125, which critically re·dews •»the previ-
8* ous Virginia decisions, declares, in taking the point away 
from the jury, that "there was not merely a deviation, 
but a total departure from the course of the master's busi-
ness.'' 
It would be useless for us completely to catalogue tl:ie Vir-
g'inia cases, many of which are hereinaftercfiscuss-ed~- for the 
reason that the pivotal issue in the case at bar will narrow 
itself down to a special phase of the deviation question. But 
it is appropriate and convenient to give now at the threshold 
of this argument a list of the more important and later Vir-
gfoia dcci.sions. Hence, we cite them as follows, in inverse 
chronolog1cal order : 
Ka'l/anaugh v. J,JTheelvng, 175 Va. 105, 7 S. E. (2) 125 
1 (sitpra). \1 Va. Ice <f; Fr. Corp. v. Coffin, 166 Va. 154 & 184 S. E. 214. 
\ Western Union v. Phelps, 160 Va. 674 & 169 S. E. 574. 
'\ Barnes v. Ha1npton, 14-9 Va. 740 & 141 S. E. 836. 
Apvalachian Power Co. v. Robertson, 142 Va. 454 & 129 
S. E. 224. 
\__Kidd v. DeWitt, 128 Va. 438 & 105 S. E. 124. 
Under this point of arg·ument it remains only for us to call 
attention to certain passages of evidence which conclusively 
establish that the deviation in the case at bar was, both geo-
graphically and in subject matter, beyond the scope of the 
employment of the driver of defendant's truck. At page 35 
of the record the driver, Levi Powell, testified as follows: 
"Q. Was there anything in connection with your job that 
took you across town to this place¥ 
"A. No, sir. 
'' Q. What instructions did you have from your employers 
about leaving your route f 
'' A. To go to Transit Mixed, take the tire off the Ford 
Truck, return it to the g·arage, fix it, and take it hack to Tran-
sit Mixed. 
"Q. Did you have any general instructions about leaving 
your route when you went out on a. job f 
'' A. Yes, sir, I have had instructions. 
''Q. What were they? 
"A. To go where I was supposed to go, and return back to 
the garage. 
91: *'' Q. Were you permitted, or for hidden, to go off the 
route for any purpose! 
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'' A. I was forbidden to go off my route for any purpose. 
"Q. Did you have permission, or were you forbidden, to 
take riders on the truck? 
'' A. I was for bidden to take riders on any of the trips.'' 
At pag·e 40 Mr. Jack Green, who occupied the executive ca-
pacity of secretary and vice-president of the Master Auto 
Service Corporation, testified as follows: 
"Q. Please tell the jury what instructions the drivers of 
the trucks have when they are sent out on a job 1 
"A. The driver of each and every truck have instructions 
to make their calls and return immediately upon the same 
route that they went, and also not to pick up any riders at 
any time. They are also instructed in meetings and bulletins 
that are handed out. It is a known fact that these instruc-
tions are that they are not to go off their routes, or not to 
pick up any riders, and to come back immediately, particularly 
when a call is made where you have to pick up a tire, repair 
it, and return it, whereby a vehicle is waiting for this par-
ticular tire. In this particular case here it was an inside tire 
on duals, and the truck could not have gone on this road un-
less he had this tire back. He was instructed to come back 
immediately.'' 
Mr. W. F. Lyle was assistant service manager of the de-
fendant company, and was directly in charge of the truck 
drivers and repair men. At page 43 he testified as follows: 
'' Q. What instructions did the truck drivers have with 
reference to what they should do when they went out on an 
assignment of that sort t 
"A. All drivers had blanket instructions, issued at meet-
ings held at various times throughout the year, to proceed 
directly over the most direct route to tlie point at which they 
were sent, and return over the same route. 
"Q. Did they have any instructions about riders! 
'' A. They were all instructed not to pick up riders along 
tl10 route.'' 
Perhaps it is not too much to say that in none of the auto-
mobile deviation cases in Virginia has the specific scope of 
the driver's employment been more definitel~v established than 
it is in the case at bar by the foregoing evidence. 
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10* •2. The Fact That Defendant's Driver Was Returning from His 
Deviation When the Accident Occurred Did Not Bring His 
Negligent Act Within the Scope of His Employment 
Both -h;_ connection with the arguments of defendant's mo-
tions to strike and in connection with the argument of de-
fendant's motion to set aside the verdict1 J uclge Hanckel rec-· 
ognized the general principles as to deviation laid down in the 
Virginia decisions, several of which, he declared 1vith humo12,. _ , 
were cases in which he had been reversed. But he 6ased liiH 
decision in the case at bar on the spcc;ific ground that at the 
time of the accident the defendant's drive1· had completed 
his personal errand of mercy and was on his way hack to hi~ 
employer's plant. Judge Haneke} held that this constituted 
a resumption of employment, and said that if the accident 
had occurred on the way eastward with the nose-bleed passen-
ger he would have sustained the defendant's motion to strike 
the evidence. From this will be seen the very narrow limits 
of the issue in this case to which we have alluded. On thiE-
precise point there has been no express decision in Virginia; 
although we expect hereinafter to show that the distinction 
made by the trial Judge is not in the mind of the Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals, and that it appears from their de-
cisions that the contrary is the view of the court. 
(a) The Out of State Decisions 
Before undertaking an analysis of the Virg-inia decisions 
to show that Judge Hanckel was in error on this point, w·e 
shall first devote some discussion to the general principle 
and to the American decisions at large. It cannot be denied 
that there is a conflict of authority on this point arnonQ; the 
text writers and the out of State decisions. W..<t su]Jmit, 
11 * howe~er,_that-the *_weig~t of _a.~tpe>ritit_b~!!_i numeric!lllY 
ancfby force of reason, 1s-agamst tlie idea tliat a drive1· 
~j~~JitS--ZQ_n~ -of -eril{!!Q~nt after ~'l-Ueviatfon is 
within the scope of his employment until he reaches that zone. 
From 5 Blashfleld Cyc. of Automobile Law and Practice, page 
212, Sec. 3051, we take ~he following· text: 
"The majority rule, and probably better view. is that tlrn 
relation of master and servant is not restored until he has re-
turned to the place where the deviation occurred or to a cor-
responding place, some place where, in the performance of 
his duty, he should be. 
''Under this rule it has been held that, where a chauffeur. 
instead of proceeding from the garage to the master's house, 
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disobeyed instructions by driving several miles in the op-
posite direction on a personal errand, he was not, on the re-
turn trip to the garage to fulfill the duties of his employment, 
acting within the scope thereof.'' 
In 42 C. J., page 1112, Sec. 871, it is said: 
'' Although there is authority to the contrary, the mere fact 
that the chauffeur after .having made an unauthorized use 
of his employer's vehicle for purposes of his own is returning 
with it does not, according to the g·enerally accepted rule, re-
instate him within the scope of his employment so as to ren-
der his employer liable for his acts, but he must have re-
turned to the point of his departure from his duties or to a 
point where in the performance of his duties he is required 
to be; in other words, the relationship of master and servant 
is regarded as suspended during the entire time during which 
he employs the vehicle until it is returned to its proper place.'' 
In the case of Hiimphrey v. Hogan (Mo.), 104 S. W. (2) 
767, the above text from Blashfield is quoted with approval 
with the comment that it well states the law as established bv 
the weight of authority. WT e quote as follows from sever~l 
of the well reasoned cases <lealing with this phase of the law 
of automobile deviation: 
Gousse v. Lowe (Cal.), 183 P. 295, 296. 
'' If the servant takes his master's machine for a junkethig 
or business trip of bis own, the trip is not complete when 
he reaches a point miles away from the place where the 
12,¥ machine *ought to be. The servant is on his own trip 
until his return to the point of departure, or to a point 
where in the performance of his duty he should be.'' 
Curry v. Bickley (Iowa), 195 N. W. 617, 618. 
"There are courts that have recognized a rule that if an 
employee" (who has deviated) "is in the act of returning-
rlirectly to the scene of his employment to resume his work 
he is in the employer's service. Vv e refuse to acquiesce in 
such a rule. The very decided weight of authority is to the 
contrary. * * * He is no more engag·ed in the employer's 
business in getting back to the place of employment than he 
was in going away from it. He is serving his own purpose 
during· all of such time. '' 
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Sou.thivest Dairy Products Co. v. DeFrates (Tex.), 125 S. 
,v. (2) 292. 
''We find ourselves unable to adopt the reasoning of the 
cases which apply this theory. Of course, the purpose in the 
mind of Henderson while on the return trip was to take up 
the duties of his master, but the master's liability does not 
rest alone upon the purpose in mind of the servant. The test 
of liability is whether he was engaged in the master's busi-
ness and not ,-~,,.hether he purposed to resume it. 
"It is equally true that Henderson owed a duty to his 
master of returning the car and resuming his employment 
and while returning· to the zone of his employment he was 
discharging that duty, but that fact does not fix liability 
against the master. It was Henderson's wrong in chiving 
away that created the duty to return and in returning he was 
not undoing that wrong. The return was referable to and an 
incident of the departure. He was no more engaged in his 
master's business while retuming to than while departing 
from his path of duty." 
Peters v. Pinia Mercantile Co. (Ariz.), 27 P. (2) 143. 
"But the sugg·estion that the accident occurred w·hilc he 
was engaged in his employer's business because it happened 
after he had procured the dog and was on his way back to 
the wholesale district to get the remainder of the merchan-
dise is without merit. While there are some decisions uphold-
ing· this view, for instance, Glass v. Wise mul McAlpin, 1!55 
La. 477, the clear weight of authority is to the contrary and 
in view correct, for there is no reasonable basis for the posi-
tion that the return portion of the trip to the hospital rests 
upon any different ground than the going pa rt of it ( citing· 
cases). The entire trip was a complete departure from his 
employment one way just as much as the other and it 
1:3* was necessary that he return to the point where *he 
started to perform his duty, the wholesale district of 
the city, before it could properly be said that he had resumed 
the services of his employer ( citing cases). The fact that 
part of the merchandise was in the truck when the accident 
occurred did not make the trip to the hospital other than a 
personal one; he was instructed to bring the merchandise to 
Marana, not to take it to the hospital." 
With no thought of exhausting the innumerable references 
to this point in the books, we are content to close this gen-
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eral discussion of the out of State decisions with the follow-
ing additional references: 
Allen v. Ross, 138 S. Yv. (2) 409. 
Usher v. Stafford, 288 N. vV. 432. 
Ruff v. Farley Machine Works, 99 P. (2) 789. 
Baltes v. Affleck, 102 P. (2) 493. 
Gm·ves v. Utica Ca.ndy Co., 204 N. Y. S. 682. 
Dawson Chevrolet Co. v. Ford, 170 S. E. 306. 
Shefts v. Free, 146 Atl. 185. 
Model La·undry Co. v. Collins, 43 S. W. (2) 693. 
vVe submit that there is no logic or reasonableness in the 
idea that the return from an unauthorized deviation is within 
the scope of employment to any greater extent than the out-
going phase of the deviation. That part of the driver's route 
which is unauthorized is the entire trip taken by him on his 
own account away from and back to his regular route or zone 
of employment. He is no more within that zone returning 
than going. It is paradoxical to predicate employer liability 
upon such a distinction. One might borrow an example from 
the present international scene. The Neutrality Act of the 
United States (which is now largely obsolete) forbids Ameri-
can vessels to use and trade in certain areas designated as 
war zones. Suppose an American vessel proceeded to a bel-
ligerent port within one of the prescribed zones, got there 
safely, but met with difficulties on her way hack. Would the 
proponents of the minority view as to return trips from 
deviation contend that such a vessel was any less within 
14• the purview of the Neutrality Law on 'K=her fateful re-
turn than she had been on her luckier voyag·e into the 
cauldron of conflict? 
(b) The Virginia Decisions 
We have heretofore stated, and it was the view of the court 
and all counsel, that in Virginia there has been no direct de-
cision on tllis specific point. N cverthelcss, we believe that it 
will appear from a close study of the Virginia decisions that 
the minority view in America is inconsistent with what is in 
the mind of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The 
c.ase of Vir,qinia Ice <t Freezinq Co. v. Coffin, 166 Va. 154 & 
184 S. E. 214, is exactly ~!l_ fo!Jrs _}Vij.h_ our c,ase at bar, 
and is conclusive in our favor, except that in that case the 
accident occurred while the driver was on the going trip of 
l1is personal deviation, and in our case at bar the driver was 
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on his return trip. Judge Hanckel expressly distinguished 
the Coffin case on that ground. It therefore- follows that if 
Judge Hanckel is in error on this particular point the de-
fendant must prevail in the case at bar. 
We reassert that, in principle and in logic, the retum por-
tion of a deviation is just as much beyond the scope of em-
ployment as the going portion. But for the deviation the 
driver would not have been at the point of accident, and the 
accident would not have occurred. It is signLcant that in 
the Virginia case of Barnes v. Hanipton, 149 Va. 740 & 141 
S. E. 836, the court quoted with approval the N cw Hampshire 
case of Danforth v. Fisher, 71 A. 535. Danforth v. Fisher was 
a case where the servant was returning to duty. The Vir-
ginia court also mentions that this same case bad been 
15* approved in the *case of Kidd v. DeWitt, 128 Va. 438 
& 105 S. E. 124. It is not likely that the Virginia court 
would have used this New Hampshire case as one of the cor-
nerstones of its decision if the Virginia court did then, or 
does now, subscribe to the minority view about returning· 
deviators. 
In the last mentioned case of Kidd v. De TVitt, the Virginia 
Court cites and comments upon two cases in which it obvi-
ously thought the principles were correctly applied to tl1c 
facts, in both of which the accident happened upon the serv-
ant's return trip after completing his own errand. Those 
cases are Danforth v. Fisher (s11,pra) and Patterson v. Kates, 
152 F. 481. The only logical deduction to be made from tho 
approval of these two return from deviation cases by the 
Virginia co11rt is that the court approved the principle that 
such cases are not for juries simply because the servant, after 
serving some purpose of his own, has turned around and i~ 
on the trip back when the accident occurs. 
If the court when it cited these cases did not mean to hold 
that they were cases in which a directed verdict was properly 
entered, then it is difficult to see what the citation of these 
cases by the court did mean; and if these cases, in the opinion 
of the court, are cases in which a directed verdict was prop-
erly entered, then it is difficult to see why the same verdict. 
or its equivalent should not be entered in our case, for there 
is no essential difference between the facts in those cases and 
the facts in our case. 
16* *But there is another even more sip;nificant indica-
tion that the minority view as to returning deviators is 
not the view of the Virginia court. If it were in the mind 
of the Virginia court that a return from a deviation was a 
resumption of duty, the court would have said so and based 
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its decision on that gTomul in the case of Sydnor <f Hundley 
v. Bonifa.nt, 158 Va. 'i03 & 164 S. E. 403. This Bonifant case 
was left to the jury. But it was left to the jury on two 
grounds only. The first was that there was· a conflict of tes-
timony presenting issues of fact. The second was that there 
were fatal admissions by ofrlcers of the employment com-
pany. No such conflict or admissions are present in our case. 
In the Bonifant case the driver, on the way back to the Syd-
nor & Hundley store and garage, detoured across the James 
River, g·ot some whiskey and got drunk. The accident oc-
curred after this while he was returning. In this case the 
court had a one hundred per cent opportunity to base the 
decision squarely on the returning point if the court thought 
that was controlling· or sig'Ilificant. The fact that the case 
was held to be for the jury on other far less obvious grounds 
is conclusive evidence that the Virg'inia court does not sub-
scribe to the minority view as to returning deviators. 
3. The Fa.ct Tha.t the Customer's Tire Was in the Defendant's Truck 
When the Accident Occurred Has No Bearing or Effect 
Upon the Def enda.nt 's Liability 
In connection with the several arguments in the trial court, 
plaintiff's counsel made the point that defendant's driver 
was on his master's business a.t the time of the accident be-
cause he had the customer's tire in the truck. Judge Hanckel 
makes mention of this in his comments in overruling defend-
ant's first motion to strike the evidence (R., p. 38), but he 
did not predicate his decision upon that point. All he 
17* said was that Powell "was taking that *tire back to tho 
Master Auto Service Corporation." Evidently the court 
had in mind the fact of returnin,g to the Master Auto Servic2 
Corporation, upon which he predicated his decision, rather 
than the fact that he had the tire. This is conclusively shovm 
by the court's statement in the argument of our motion to 
set aside the verdict (unreported) that if the accident ha<l 
occurred on the going trip tl1e decision would haYe been fo,· 
the defendant as a matter of law. 
The fact that the customer's property is on the truck deR-
tined for the master's place of business is no indication that 
the servant is on business of the master. He mav at the verv 
moment of accident, as was Powell in our ca~e, be on ai1 
errand of his own, despite the carrying of the cnstomer'H 
tire. Indeed, his departure from his dutv was all the more 
flagrant by reason of that fact, which serves only to empha-
size it. The ultimate question in these cases is when the 
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servant resumes the service of the master; and on this ques-
tion the more convincing view, as well as the majority view, 
is that he has not resumed the scope of his employment un-
til be has returned to the point where he departed from his 
duties or to a corresponding place; a place where, in the per-
formance of his duties, he should be. We submit that it ne-
cessarily appears from the Virginia decisions that this is 
also the view of the Virginia court. 
As to the immateriality of the contents of the truck at the 
time of the accident, we refer to the following out of State 
eases: 
Humphrey v. Hogmi, 103 S. W. (2) 767. 
Allen v. Ross, 138 S. W. (2) 409 . 
. Model La,U/ndry v. Collins, 43 S. vV. (2) 693. 
Peters v. Pinia Mercantile Co., 27 P. (2) 143. 
1s~ •IV. CONCLUSION. 
A Writ of Error and Supersedea.s Should Be Awarded: and the 
Judgment of the Trial C'ourt Should Be Reversed and 
Judgment Should Be Entered for Defendant. 
For the reasons hereinabove stated, and for errors ap-
parent on the record, your petitioner prays for a writ of 
error and supersedeas to the judgment aforesaid, and prays 
tl1at the said judgment may be reviewed and reversed, and 
for such other relief as your petitioner may be entitled to 
receive. 
If writ of error should be granted, your petitioner asks 
that this petition be treated as the opening brief of the plain-
tiff in error. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MASTER AUTO SE·RVICE CORPORATION, 
By HUGHES, LITTLE & SEA WELL, Counsel, 
936 Wainwright Building, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
H. M. HUGHES, JR. 
For Plaintiff in Error. 
August 4, 1941.. 
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OERTIFIOATE OF COUNSEL. 
I, R. AL Hughes, Jr., attorney at law, practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that in. 
my opinion the judgment complained of in the foregoing pe-
tition should be reviewed. 
Norfolk, Virginia, 
August 4, 1941. 
R. M. HUGHES, JR. 
Attorney for Petitioner, 
936 Wainwright Building, 
Norfolk, Virginia~ 
19• •NOTICE TO OPPOSING COUNSEL AND ACCEPTANCE 
OF SERVICE. 
To ROLAND THORP, ESQ., 
Counsel for Cledious :M:. Bowden: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the foregoing petition for 
a writ of error in this cause will be presented to the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virgfoia, at Richmond, 
on Friday, Aug-ust 8, 1941. 
~rhe petitioner, under Rule 9 of the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia, effective January 1, 1939, elects, in lieu 
of oral argument, to file a written reply to any brief that 
may be filed by you in opposition to this petition for a writ 
of error. 
Norfolk, Virginia, 
August 4, 1941. 
R. M. HUGHES, JR. 
for Petitioner. 
Service of the foregoing notice ancl copy of petition ac-
cepted this 4th day of August, 1941. 
ROLAND THORP, 
Counsel for Cledious· M. Bowden. 
Received August 8, 1941. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
16 Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia: 
Writ of error and supersedeas granted. Bond $4,500 .. 
.August 28, 1941.. JOHN W. EGGL:Ji}STON .. 
Received August 29, 1941. 
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page 1 ~ VIRGINIA: 
M. B. "\V. 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of the Citv of Norfolk 
at the Courthouse thereof, on the 23rd day of June, in 
the year of om Lord nineteen hundred and forty-one. 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that heretofore, to-wit: In the 
Circuit Court aforesaid, on the 14th day of October, 1940, 
came the plaintiff, Cledious :M:. Bowden, and docketed his 
notice of motion for judg1nent against the defendant, Maste1· 
Auto Service Corporation, in the following words and fig-
ures, to-wit : 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk. 
Cledious M. Bowden, Plaintiff 
v. 
Master Auto Service Corporation, Defendant 
To Master Auto Service Corporation, 
Colonial A.venue and 20th Street 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
TA.KE NOTICE that on Monday, October 14th, 1940, at 
10 :00 o 'elock A.. M. or as soon thereafter as I can be heard, 
I shall move the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, for a judgment against you in the s11m of Twenty-five 
Thousand ($25,000.00) Dollars which sum is due and owing 
hy . you to me as damage by reason of the following facts, 
to-wit: 
That heretofore, to-wit on or about the 6th day 
page 2 ~ of .April, 1940, I was standing· on the sidewall~, 
where I had a rig·ht to be, at or near the intersec-
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tion of Princess Anne Road and ·wide Street. At the same 
time a certain automobile truck o,vned by you, l\faster Auto 
Service Corporation, and operated and controlled by one 
Levi Powell, as your agent, and acting within the scope of 
his employment in and about your business, was proceeding 
west on Princess Anne Road at a point to the east of its 
intersection with Wide Street. Whereupon it became. and 
was your duty through your said servant and agent to op-
erate your said truck in a skilful and careful manner. 
Yet, totally disregarding your duty in this behalf you 
through your said agent and servant, carelessly, negligently, 
unlawfully, and in disregard of my safety, while I was law-
fully standing· on the south side of Princess Anne Road on 
the sidewalk provided for pedestrians, so operated said truck 
that the same was driven with gTcat force from the path of 
the northern lane of traffic on Princess Anne Road across 
the same to the south side thereof, and on and upon the 
southern pavement at or near the intersection of Princess 
Anne Road and Wide Steeet and ran the same violentlv 
against and over me, throwing me with great force to th"e 
g-round, and by reason of your said negligence 9ertain of 
my bones were fractured, and I was greatly lacerated, 
hruised and torn, both internally and externally, and by rea-
son thereof I became and ,vas, and still am permanently and 
totally disabled from following my usual employment, to-
wit, that of longshoreman, and thereby I was compelled to 
1·emain in the hospital for a long period of time, to-wit, forty-
nine days, and compelled to submit to various operations and 
treatments in an endeavor to be cured of my said injuries. 
By reason of your said negligence I am permanently maimed, 
disabled and disfigured, and permanently incapaci-
pag~ 3 ~ tated for the ordinary duties and pleasures of lifo, 
and by reason thereof I have suffered, and still 
:mffer great bodily lmrm and permanent mental and physi-
cal anguish, and will for the remainder of my life. 
That heretofore, to-wit, on or about the 6th day of April, 
1940 I was standing on the sidewalk at or near the inte1'-
8ection of Princess Anne Road and Wide Street, in the City 
of Norfolk, where I had a right to be. At the same time n 
certain automobile truck owned by you, Master Auto SerY-
ice Corporation, and operated and controlled by one Levi 
Powell as your agent, and returning to your place of busi-
ness from a certain business trip upon wl1ich you had sent 
him, was proceeding west on Princess Anne Road in the 
northern lane of the traffic on said road. Whereupon it 
became and was your duty to use a high degree of care to 
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see that your said truck did not run on and upon the side-
walk provided for pedestrians. 
Yet, totally disregarding your duty in this behalf, you 
through your said agent and servant, carelessly, neg·lig·ently, 
unlawfully, and in disregard of my safety, while I was law-
fullv standing· on the south side of Princess Anne Road on 
the ~sidevmlk ptovided for pedestrians, so operated said truck 
that the same was driven with g·reat force from the path 
of the northern lane of traffic on Princess Anne Road across 
the same to the south side thereof, and on and upon the 
southern pavement at or near the intersection of Princess 
Anne Road and Wide Street and ran the same violently 
against and over me, throwing me with great force to the 
ground, and by reason of your said negligence certain of 
my bones were fractured, and I was greatly lacerated, 
bruised and torn, both internally and externally, and by rea-
son thereof I became and was, and still am per-
page 4 ~ manently and totally disabled from following my 
usual employment, to-wi.t, that of longshoreman, 
and thereby I was compelled to remain in the hospital for 
a long period of time, to-wit, forty-nine days, and compelled 
to submit to various operations and treatments in an en-
deavor to be cured of my said injuries. By reason of your 
said neg·ligence I am permanently maimed, disabled and dis-
fignred, and permanently incapacitated for the ordinary du-
ties and pleasures of life, and by reason thereof I have suf-
fered, and still suffer great bodily harm and permanent men-




CLEDIOUS M. BOWDEN. 
By Counsel. 
'1.1he following is the Sergeant's Return made on the fore-
going Notice of ~fotion : 
Executed Sept. 17th, 1940, by delivering a copy of the 
within to J. I. Green, Treasurer Master Auto Service Corp., 
a Corporation, in the City of Norfolk, wherein he resides 
and wherein the said Corporation is doing· business. 
LEE F. LAWLER, 
Sergt. City of Norfolk, Va. 
By ,T. R. HUME, Deputr. 
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And on the same day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said on the 14th day of October, in the year, 1940. 
Upon motion of the plaintiff, it is ordered that 
page 5 } this notice of motion be docketed. And thereupon 
came the parties by counsel, and the said defend-
ant thereupon pleaded the general issue, to which the plain-
tiff replied generally, and issue is joined; and the said de-
fendant, with leave of court, filed herein its affidavit deny-
ing operation and control of the truck alleged to have caused 
the accident; and the further hearing is continued. 
The fo1lowing is the affidavit filed by leave of the fore-
going order : 
State of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
Samuel Green, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
My position with the defendant, Master Auto Service 
Corporation, is President. As such I am informed as to the 
contents of this affidavit and authorized to make same. 
At the time of the accident in suit, on the 6th day of April, 
1940, the snid defendant, Master Auto Service Corporation, 
did not operate and control the truck by which the plaintiff 
is alleged to have been injured; nor was the operator of the 
truck at tl1e time and place that the said alleged injury was 
sustained, an ag·ent of the said defendant, nor acting within 
the scope of any employment. in and about the business of 
the said defendant. 
SAMUEL GREEN. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of Oc-
tober, 1940. 
J. SYDNEY FITZGERALD, 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires : March 8, 1943. 
page 6 ~ And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
aforesaid, on the 20th day of May, in the year, 
1941. 
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This day came again the parties, by counsel, and thereupon 
came a jury, to-wit: Peter Zuidema, J. L. Binford, G. R. 
Fisher, H. S. Rice, E. L. Johnson, T. C. Billups and C. T. 
Shumadine, who were sworn to well and truly try the issue 
joined, and having· fully heard the evidence and argument 
of counsel returned their verdict in the following words and 
figures, to-wit: "'vVe, the jury, find for the plaintiff and 
assess his damages at $3,500.00' '. And thereupon said de-
fendant, by counsel, moved the Court to set aside the ver-
dict of the jury and grant it a new trial on the grounds that 
the same is contrary to the law and the evidence; and the 
further hearing of which motion is continued. 
And now, at this <lhy, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said on the 28rd day of June, 1941, the day and year first 
hereinabove written: 
ThiH day cam•J again the parties by counsel and the motion 
. for a nc,v trial heretofore made herein having been fully 
heard and matmely considered by the Court is overruled. 
Whereupon it is considered by the Court that said plaintiff 
recover agaiI1st said defendant the sum of Thirty-five Hun-
dred ($3,500.00) Dollars, with legal interest thereon from the 
20th day of May, in the year, 1941, till paid, together with his 
costs about his suit in this behalf expended, to all of which 
said defendant, by counsel, duly excepted. 
Aud thereupon said defendant having signified its 
page 7 ~ intention of applying to the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia for a writ of error and s1.tper-
sedea.s to the foregoing juclg·ment it is ordered that execution 
upon sa.id judgment be suspended for the period of sixty (60) 
days from the end of this term of the Court upon said def end-
ant, or someone for it, enterin~ into and acknowledging a 
proper suspending bond before tne Clerk of this Court in the 
penalty of Four Thousand ($4,000.00) Dollars, with surety to 
be approved by said Clerk and with condition according to 
law. 
page 8 ~ In the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
Virginia. 
Cledious M. Bowden, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Master Auto Service Corporation, Defendant. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
To Mr. Roland Thorp, .A.ttorney for the plaintiff: 
Please take notice that on the 15th day of July, 1941, at 
10 o'clock A. M., or as soon thereafter as we may be heard, at 
his office the undersigned will present to Hon. A. R. Hanckel, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virgi.nia, 
who presided over the trial of the abovementioned case in 
the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, on May 
20, 1941, the stenographic report of the testimony and other 
incidents of the trial in the above case to be authenticated 
and verified by him. 
And also that the undersigned will, at the same time and 
place, request the Clerk of the said court to make up and 
deliver to counsel a transcript of the record in the above en-
titled cause for the purpose of presenting the same with ape-
tition to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a 
writ of error and supersedeas therein. 
MASTER AUTO SERVICE CORPORATION. 
By HUGHES, LITTLE & SEA WELL, 
Attorneys. 
Service accepted this 14th day of July, 1941. 
page 9 ~ 
ROLAND THORP, 
Attorney. 
In the Cir~uit Court of the City of Norfolk, 
Virginia. 
Cleclious :M. Bowden, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Master Auto Service Corporation, Defendant. 
RE.CORD. 
Stenographic report of all the testimony, together with all 
of the motions, objections, and exceptions on the part of the 
respective parties, the action of the Court in respect thereto, 
and aH other incidents of the trial of the case of Cledious ir. 
Bowden v. Master Auto Service Corporation, tried in the Cir-
cuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, May 20, 1941, be-
fore Hon. A. R. Hanek el and a jury. 
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Dr. George A. D'U/ncan, 
Present: Mr. Roland Thorp, Counsel for the plaintiff. 
Messrs. Hughes, Little & Seawell (Mr. Robert M. Hughes, 
Jr.) and l\Ir. J. Sydney Fitzgerald, Counsel for the defend-
ant. 
J. M. Knight, 
Shorthand Reporter, 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
page 10 ~ DR. GEORGE A. DUNCAN, 
'"' called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, hav-
ing been first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Thorp: 
Q. You are a practicing physician in the City of Norfolk? 
A. lam. 
Q. vVere you called upon in April 1940 to treat this man 
for the injuries he received f 
A. I was. 
Q. Will you state to the jury the nature of the injuries, 
the extent of your treatment, and his present condition f 
A. I was asked by Dr. Reynolds, who first saw this patient, 
to see him at the St. Vincent's Hospital. 
The Court : Speak a little louder. 
A. First, I was asked by Dr. Reynolds to see this patient, 
who was in St. Vincent's Hospital. The patient at that time 
had marked swelling around the left ankle and heel, extend-
ing up about halfway into the leg. An X-ray taken showed 
a fracture of the heel bone. It is what we call the os calcis. 
This fracture was the back and upper portion of that bone, 
and that is the portion of the bone to which the heel cord is 
attached. The heel cord is part of your calf muscle. That 
was detached and had risen upward. It was not attached 
to the other part of the bone at all. Because of the marked 
swelling, we waited about nine or ten days to al-
page 11 ~ low most of that swelling to subside. It was im-
possible to g·et the bone back into position just 
by manipulation, because the tendon kept pulling that upper 
frag·ment away. An incision was made in both sides of the 
heel, and the bone, with the tendon attached, was pulled down 
and wired; sewed in place. Then a plastercast. was applied. 
Because of the tremendous hemorrhage that was present, and 
there were some blisters that had heen present, an infection 
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Dr. George A. Du.noan. 
developed. With that infection, drainage took place for many 
weeks. We kept him in the hospital for approximately six 
weeks from the time of his injury at that time. He continued 
to have drainage from these wounds. In September of last 
year we put him back in the hospital. The wires were re-
moved, and dead pieces of bone, due to the infection, were also 
removed. By the removal of the wire and the dead pieces of 
bone, the incisions had healed, I think, along about the first 
part of this year, and those incisions have remained healed. 
At the present time this patient has limitation of lateral 
motion of his foot. I mean, this motion here (indicating)-
side to side. This motion-up and down-is fairly good. 
Mr. Hughes: Indicating up and down, Doctor. The Re-
porter cannot get your foot on the record. 
A. Due to the injury that he sustained to the bone, to which 
the heel cord is attached, he is not able to rise on 
page 12 ~ on the toes of his left foot alone~ By using both 
feet, he is able to come up some. It is very diffi-
cult to determine how much power he has from that point 
of view. 
By Mr. Thorp: 
Q. Doctor, assuming that his business is that of longshore-
man, requiring· the wheeling of trucks, and heavy loads, and 
going up on the gangway, would you say that he is now in 
condition to perform those duties? 
A. I don't think he could perform them adequately. 
Q. Doctor, what is your charge for the services that you 
liave just recounted f 
A. $150. 
Q. Do you consider this condition tlmt you have described 
yJermanent or temporary? 
A. I think. he bas a JJermanent disability. 
CROSS EXAl\HNATION. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. What fraction f 
A. I beg your pardon. 
Q. What fraction? 
A . .Approximately a third-30%. 
Q. Did you find he had any venereal disease when you had 
the case? 
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Oledious M. Bowden (colored). 
A. I can't report on the Vi asserrnann now, be-
page 13 ~ cause I don't recall the chart. I remember seeing 
· on there whe1·e an intern had written up on his 
diagnosis "Lues," which is the name we commonly use for 
syphilis. Whether his Wassermann was positive, I can not 
answer you now. 
CLEDIOUS M. BOWDEN ( colored), 
the plaintiff, having been first duly sworn, testified as fol-
lows: 
Examined by Mr. Thorp: 
Q. Your name is Cledious M. Bowden 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. You have brought this suit, claiming you were hurt on 
.April 6 of last year f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell these gentlemen all you know about the accident, 
itself, where you ,·vere, and what you were doing, in yo1w 
own wayt 
A. Well, on the 6th of April, 1940, I was standing on the 
comer of Princess Anne and Wide Streets. 
Q. Were you on the sidewalk or out in the street¥ 
A. I was on the sidewalk. I was waiting for a bus. I had 
a call to go to work at 4 :15. I was standing there as usual. 
We were all talking-a bunch of men-getting ready to go to 
work. All of a sudden, why, I heard a noise, and, 
page 14 ~ before I could look, I was ]mocked out in the street. 
What happened, I just" could not sa.y, but I know 
the officers and people was picking me up, and when I know 
anything, it was all over witl1. 
Q. Have yon been able to do any work since then? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Which foot was it that was hurt f 
A. My left foot. 
Q. Is that foot still swollen! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The doctor testified that you were in tbe hospital for 
some length of time. What was your hospital hill ·y 
A. My hospital bill at the time was $224.40. 
Q. This first bill seems to cover a. period from April 6 to 
May 25, and amounts to $169.65? 
A. That is right. 
Q. That was the first time you were in the hospital? 
A·. The first time. 
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L. B. Boeding. 
Q. Then the next bill seems to cover from September 16 to 
September 29 ¥ 
A. That is right. 
Q. Is that the second time you were in the hospital Y 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Thorp: I wish to introduce this in evidence as "Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 1." 
page 15 ~ ( The two hospital bills are marked and filed in 
evidence as "Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1.' ') 
Mr. Thorp: That is all. 
Mr. Hughes: No questions. 
L. B. HOEDING, 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having been first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by :Mr. Thorp: 
Q. You are Mr. L. B. Hoeding, connected with the Police 
Department of the City of Norfolk? 
A. lam. 
Q. I understand that you arrived on the scene shortly after 
an accident 011 April 6, 1940, at the corner of Wide and Prin-
cess Anne Road; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. If necessary, will you refer to your notes and tell the 
jury what condition you found there1 
A. On the 6th of April, 1940, at approximately 3 :55 in tho 
evening, we received a radio call of an automobile accident, 
and that someone was injured, and to go to Princess Anne 
and Wide Streets. On arriving at the scene of the accident, 
there was quite a crowd collected in Wide Street just south 
of Princess Anne Road, which is a general condi-
pagc 16 ~ tion around there lots of times. The longshore-
men's hall is situated there, and longshoremen 
generally collect all around the place. They get picked out 
by the foreman for the jobs they are supposed to take. 
On arriving there, there seemed to be several persons 
who were lying in the street. There was a truck partly on 
the curbing and partly in the street, on the west side of Wide 
Street, south of Princess Anne Road, headed rig·bt towards 
the wall of the building. Two other officers, I believe, at that 
time were already at the scene of the accident. Officer Grif-
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fin and myself were in the radio car. They indicated the man 
who was the driver of this truck, who was being held. We 
received notification that the patrol wagon, or emergency 
wagon, was on the way. We managed to take the driver of 
the truck iuto custody, and also put two of the wounded per-
sons in our car. The rest were put in the patrol wagon and 
were taken to St. Vincent "s Hospital. Do you want me to 
testify to the driver's condition i 
Q. No, that is not necessary. Did you return to the scene 
of the accident afterwards? 
A. Later on, yes, sir. 
Q. Did you make any investigation of any tiremarks, or 
anything? 
A. We tried to make as much of an investigation as we 
possibly could. We also have got to turn in a special report. 
vVe try to interview witnesses, and so on, and 
page 17 ~ make as much investigation as we possibly can. 
Q. Did you make any diagram at the time! 
.A. Roughly, yes, sir, I made a diagram. 
Q. Have you got that diag·ram with you! 
A. I haven't got it with me, but it is very clear in my 
mind. · 
Q. Did your investigation, indicated from the tiremarks, 
or anything else, show how far the truck had run on the south 
sidewalk of Princess Amie A venue? 
Mr. Hughes: If your Honor please, I object to that as 
leading. 
Mr. Thorp: I asked the witness to indicate by tiremarks, 
or otherwise-
The Court: That is all right. Don't suggest to him which 
street it was. 
By Mr. Thorp: 
Q. From the tiremarks, was there any indication whether 
the truck had driven on the sidewalk, and, if so, how far it 
ran on the sidewalk 1 · 
A. Actua 1 measurement, I did not take. Officer Griffin 
did. I was concerned most with the report that was taken 
in the hospital. There were origfoally four adults and two 
chi]dren-two minors-in the hospital. About an hour later 
th~re was another adult who showed up, and, upon question-
ing him, we found out that he was implicated in 
page 18 ~ the same accident. 
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By the Court: 
Q. What he asked you about was the tiremarks 1 
A. I took no actual measurement of any tiremarks. 
13y Mr. Thorp: 
Q. To whom did this truck belong? 
A. To the Master Auto Service Corporation. 
Mr. Thorp: That is all 
l\fr. Hug·hes: No questions. 
R. M. GRIFFIN, 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having been first 
duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Thorp: 
Q. Mr. Griffin, Mr. Hoeding has testified you were with 
him in the patrol car? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you heard his testimony f 
A. 1:es, sir. · 
Q. Did· you make any observations as 1o tiremarks, .indi-
cating where this truck had run before striking this plaintiff 
here? 
A. I did after we had taken the man to the hospital. We 
went back to the scene of the accident. 
Q. What did the tiremarks indicate as to 
page 19 ~ whether he had run on the sidewalk, and, if so, 
how far he had run on the sidewalk? 
Mr. Hughes: I make the same objection to t.hat question, 
as leading. 
The Court: I overrule the objection. 
A. On the sidewalk. 
By Mr. Thor-p: 
Q. Which sidewalk¥ 
A. On the southeast corner of Wide and Princess Anne 
Road. This truck, which was driven by Powell, came on the 
left side of the street from the corner of the curb of Wide 
Street, and it was the corner of the curb which he hit-the 
side of the curb, ra.ther. He went between 50 and 55 feet 
on the sidewalk on the left-hand side of Princess Anne Road. 
28 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Lloyd H. Creekmore. 
By the Court : 
Q. Is that the south side or north side of Princess Anne 
Road!· 
A. That would be on the south side of Princess Anne Roa<.l 
at "\Vide. He went between a fireplug, which is on that cor-
ner, and a telephone pole, and also a tree there, too. I-le-
went between the building and the tree and the pole. Then 
this truck went on across ·wide Street, you lmow,. to the south-
west corner, and went up on the curbing towards the building 
line; that is, the skidmarks-1 mean, the tiremarks of the 
car. 
page 20 ~ By Mr. Thorp: 
Q. How wide is Wide Street at that point! 
A. Wide Street at that point, I would say, is around 27 
feet. I wouldn't say, to be exact; probably 30. I didn't 
measure the width of Wide Street. 
Q. Assuming it was the smaller amount-27 feet-
A. It could be more or less. I did not measure it. 
Q. -assuming it was the smaller amount, that would make 
77 feet that this truck mn after running up on the sidewalk t 
A. Approximately, yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know who owned the truck f 
A. The name on the truck was "Master Auto Service." 
Mr. Thorp : That is all. 
Mr. Hughes: No questions .. 
LLOYD H. CREEKMORE, 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having been first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by :Mr. Thorp: 
Q. You are connected with the Norfolk Police Depart-
menU 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Will you tell these gentlemen what happened 
page 21 ~ at the corner of Wide Street and Princess Amie 
Road on April 6, 1940 f 
A. Officer Fulcher and myself were doubled up togethel", 
and we were standing there on the southeast corner of Wide 
and Princess Anne Road. I heard a lot of commotion, and 
I turned around to see what the commotion was. I heard a 
lot of men screaming. There was a crowd gathered up there. 
The longshoremen meet there to go to work on different oc-
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casions. I ran up to see what the trouble was. Officer :B,ul-
cher, who was doubled up with me, he ran and got the radio 
.-phoned for the radio car. This truck was then across Wide 
Street, on the southwest corner of Wide Street where the 
truck stopped. After we got the call for the radio car, we 
commenced getting the men up there who got hurt, and finally 
the witnesses who saw it. 
Q. Mr. Creekmore, did you make any diagram, or drawing, 
of that location? 
A. I have got kind of a map there in my cap. 
Q. Made at the time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you let us see that, please, sirY (The witness does 
as requested.) Did you make an investigation of tiremarks, 
or anything? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You say you made this at the time, on that day? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Thorp: I introduce this in evidence, if your 
page 22 ~ Honor please, as "Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2." 
(The card was marked and filed in evidence as '' Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 2. ") 
Q. ,vm you take this drawing, and explain just what hap-
pened! 
A. This is vVest Princess Anne Road. The truck went in 
this manner: On the edge of the curb this way. There is a 
telegraph pole here, and there is a sign pole here, and there 
is a fireplug right there. There is where the truck stopped, 
right there. There is a beer joint right here, a grocery store 
here, and the longshoremen 's hall there. 
Q. Where was the plaintiff standing when he was struck? 
A. I could not say where he was struck at. I heard the 
hollering. I didn't know which one w·as struck. 
By a Juror: 
Q. Officer, where were you standing1 
A. I was standing off along in here. 
Q. The southeast corner? 
A. The southeast corner. Here is West Princess Anne, 
and this is East Princess Anne, and here is South Wide, and 
here is North Wide. Wide Street does not come up in an in-
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tersection like some of the streets do. It comes off in this 
manner. 
Q. You said 55 feeU 
A. I don't know how much it is. 
page 23 ~ Mr. Thorp : I think he testified 50 feet from 
that point 'to this point. 
A. Officer Griffin made the statement. I didn't measure 
it. 
By :Mr. Thorp: 
Q. Do you think he is far off on his measurements? 
A. I could not say. I am not going to say one way or the 
other. I am not going to say ''yes" or ''no." 
Q. Officer, do you know to whom this truck belonged? 
A. It had a sig·n on it "Master Auto Supply." 
Q. Do you know what became of the truck? 
A. Mr. Green come up there and took the truck away. 
Q. Who is Mr. Green Y 
A. Sam Green. 
Q. I know, but has he anything to do with Master Auto 
ServiceY 
A. He claims to be the boss, as far as I know. 
By a ,Juror: 
Q. Did you observe whether the driver of that truck ,va~ 
in any way intoxicated? 
A. Yes, sir, he was intoxicated. 
Mr. Thorp: That is all. 
Mr. Hughes: No questions. 
page 24 ~ DONNIE LITTLE (colored), 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, lrnv-
ing been first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by :Mr. Thorp: 
Q. I hand you a sketch which the officer made on April 
<-i, and ask you if you can identify the streets from that sketch. 
The officer teRtified- this was Princess Anne Road, that being· 
west, and that being· east, and south Wide Street and north 
,vide Street 1 
A. That is right. 
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Q. Does that enable you to picture the ground up there? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you at the time of this accident which we 
have been talking abouU · 
A. I was right along here, just a few steps from the cor-
ner. 
By the Court: 
Q. You say you were "right over there." That doesn't 
mean anything. 
By Mr. Thorp: 
Q. Make a hole there_ where you were, and then I think Mr. 
Hughes and I can agree on it. 
(Witness does as requested.) 
Q. You were standing· on the east side of south Wide Street, 
about how many feet south of Princess Anne? 
A. I was standing about ten or :fifteen feet-
page 25 ~ about :fifteen feet from them, kind of with my right 
side, when I heard the noise coming down the 
street. All of a sudden I turned around. 
Q. What did you observe, Little? What did you seef 
A. \Vell, I was standing there just a few feet, as I said, 
from the corner, with my right side kind of towards the 
street, and all of a sudden I heard a noise coming down the 
sidewalk, and, just as I looked around, I saw those two men 
coming over just like that, and the truck ran across Wide 
Street and ran over there near the building, and come to a 
stop over there. It was done so quick, and there was so much 
excitement, I did not see the truck when it first hit, but I saw 
when it come on by the store there, and passed right along. 
I wasn't far from there. I just turned around like this, and 
saw the men going over like that. 
Q. You didn't see the truck when it first came on the side-
walk¥ 
A. I didn't see it when it first came on the sidewalk. 
Q. Did you measure the tiremarks, or examine the tire-
marks? 
A. I didn't measure it, but, in my estimation, it was some· 
where around forty feet-ran do"''ll the sidewalk about forty 
feet. 
Q. Do you know how wide W"ide Street is there? 
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A. I will give you an estimation as to about how 
page 26 ~ wide Wide Htreet is. You can park a car on each 
side,·. and two cars can pass one another in there 
going by, by being careful. 
Q. With cars ,parked on both sides, cars can pass without 
any trouble f 
A. Yes, sir. I do that any time. 
Mr. Thorp: That is all. 
Mr. Hughes: No questions. 
'WINSTON MASO;N (colored), 
called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, having been 
first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
Examined by Mr. Thorp: 
Q. Mason, look at this drawing and see if you can under-
stand that as a drawing of that corner. The officer has testi-
fied that is Princess Anne Road, the point of the pencil going 
towards the east, that being south Wide Street and north 
\Vide Street, with the longeshoremen 's hall, and a store, and 
a store, and a store. Can you take a pencil and put down 
where you were when this accident occurred? 
A. The post rig·ht here on the corner. I was sitting in 
my automobile, facing right into Princess Anne Road, right 
at the corner. 
Q. On north Wide Street or south "Wide Street! 
page 27 ~ A. North "\¥"ide Street. 
Q. Where you put your pencil would put you on 
the left-hand side of the street. Were you on the-
Mr. Hughes: I object to that as leading. 
A. I was on the right-hand side. 
By Mr. Thorp: 
Q. Put your pencil where yon were. (The witness does 
as requested.) Were you in the street or on the sidewalk! 
A. Sitting in my automobile. 
Q. Right there? 
A. Right at the building line. 
Q. You were headed this way 1 
A. Yes, sir, looking into Princess Anne Road, right on the 
corner. 
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Q. You were sitting there facing south, down towards south 
·wide Streett 
A. That is right. 
Q. Tell these gentlemen what you saw happen, and, if ne-
cessary, you may get up and point on that ca rd. 
A. I can tell them just so. 
Q. What is that T 
A. I can tell them just so. 
Q. Tell them just in your own way what you saw. 
A. I seen the truck coming up the street in the 
page 28 r middle of the· block between Chicazola and vVide, 
and he was coming at a rate of speed around thirty 
or thirty-five miles an hour. When he gets right in front of 
the north side of Wide Street, he taken to the sidewalk. 
Q. "\Vhich sidewalk-the left or right? 
A. The left-hand side. It was right straight down the side-
walk, across Wide Street, and put his front wheels on the 
other sidewalk, pointing towards the building. 
Q. Do you drive an automobile? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What speed do you estimate he was going 1 
A. Between thirty and thirty-fi~e miles an hour; not less 
than that. 
Q. Did you see anything that would cause him to run up 
on the sidewalk Y 
A. He was driving along, and he seemed to turn his head 
to look at something, and, when he did, a car loaded with 
w·hite fellows backed out of Wide Street, and, wl1en he looked, 
he was too close on them, and he throwed his car like that, 
a.nd I figure he lost control of it. 
Q. If this car had been proceeding at a speed, say of 
twenty miles an hour, in your opinion, would there ha.ve been 
nny occasion for him to go on the sidewalk? 
Mr. Hughes: Objected to as leading. 
The Court: You have not proved he is an expert yet. 
page 29 r By ]\fr. Thorp: 
Q. How long have you been drh1ing! 
A. Since 1916. 
Mr. Thorp: I think a man who has been driving an auto-
mobile that long could express his opinion. 
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By Mr. Thorp: 
Q. Did you see anything that would cause him to run fifty 
feet on the sidewalk on the left-hand side? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. If he did run fifty feet on the sidewalk and across Wide 
Street thirty feet, what do you think was the cause of it? 
A. I think the brakes were not good, or he just lost his 
head. 
Mr. Thorp: That is all. 
Mr. Hughes: No question. 
Mr. Thorp: If your Honor please, I would like to ask 
Levi Powell about two questions as an adverse witness. 
The Court: In what respect is he adverse? 
Mr. Thorp: He was the operator of this truck. 
Mr. Hug·hes: He is not a party to this suit, and is not in 
the employ of the defendant. Why is he adverse ·1 
page 30 ~ :Mr. Thorp: I think that the operator of a ve-
hic1e which has injured people is, of necessity, 
adverse, whether he is a party to the suit or not. 
Mr. Hughes: I cannot accede to that. He is not an em-
ployee, and is not a party. 
The Court: I overrule the objection, and you can note 
your exception. 
Mr. Hughes: I except, sir. 
LEVI POWELL (colored), 
called as an adverse witness, haying been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Thorp : 
Q. Powell, on April 6 of last year, you were employed by 
the Master Auto Service Corporation, were you not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you in their employ at the time of this accident? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you returning to their main place on Colley Ave-
nue at the time of this accident? 
l\ .. At the time of the accident, yes, sir. 
Q. Where were you going? 
A. I was going across town; at least, I was go-
pag·e 31 ~ ing back toward the garage, hut I-
The Court: Talk a little louder. 
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A. I had left my route and was off duty. 
By Mr. Thorp: 
Q. But you were at that time going· back to the garage, 
were you noU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. At the time of the accident 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you had in the truck the tire that you had changed 
down at Mr. Twohy's place? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were taking that back to be repaired 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. If you had taken an ordinarily direct route back to the 
shop from the York Street address of the customer, what 
street would you have used north to the shop after you 
crossed the creek 7 
.A.. You mean after I got over the bridge f 
Q. Yes.-
A. I would have turned left. 
Q. Would it be the first or second street f 
A. The first street. 
page 32 ~ Q. That curved street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That is Mowbray Arch? 
A. I would have turned left there. 
Q. To Colonial? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then you would go out Colonial Street to the shop? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, in order to get to Mowbray Arch, you had to cross 
the Botetourt bridge 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that took you from the corner of York and Bote. 
tourt across the bridg·e 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where did you leave that routet 
A. I left it on York Street. 
Q. You left it on York Street? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Instead of turning into Botetourt, you continued 011 
out York? 
A. Yes, sir. 
l\fr. Thorp: Mr. Hughes, I realize you have to 
page 3:3 ~ get these things from the witness, but you are 
really testifying. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. You went where f 
A. To Princess Anne Road and Chapel Street. 
Q. What took you on that trip off of yoUI' route f 
A. A fellow, who I seen, said he had hemorrhage from his 
nose, and he was weak. He asked me would I take him across 
town, and I told liim I would, and I taken him. 
Q. Where was this man whom you picked up? 
A. On York and Botetourt Streets, near the corner there. 
Q. Did you know him f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What did he say to yonf 
A. No more than he whistled, and I looked around. I 
stopped, and he came over. He said he was sick and suffered 
from hemorrhage, and would I take him across town, and I 
told him I would, and that is what I did. 
Q. And yon put him out at what place? 
A. Princess Anne Road and Chapel Street. 
Q. Did he say anything about where he was g·oingf 
A. No, sir, no more than the drugstore on the corner. He 
said, "I don't live but a block from here, and I can make it 
I1ome. '' I put him out there. 
Q. Have you seen that man since? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Have you been out with me and with the men 
page 34 ~ at the shop to try to find him f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Thorp: I object to that as being· utterly immaterial. 
Mr. Hughes: I just want to show that we tried to find 
him. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. Tell what effort has been made to try to find him! 
A. l\fr. Leon Nowitzkv tried to find him. I went out with 
you and- ~ 
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The Court: Talk a little louder. 
A. I went out with Mr. Hughes and Mr. Fitzg·erald there. 
I have made all efforts to try to find him, but I have not been 
able to. No one seems to know him, or see him, or anything. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. Have you measured the distance where you left your 
regular route to the point where this accident occurred f 
A. No, sir, I haven't. 
Q. You were not with Mr. Lyle when he did tha U 
A. Yes, sir, but I didn't--
Q. You didn't notice the measurement T 
A. No, sir. 
Q. After you put the man out, what happened l 
A. I backed in Wide Street to turn around, 
page 35 ~ heading back towards the garage. I would say I 
was about sixteen feet this side of \Vide Street 
when this car pulled from the curb. I could not stop no way 
if I wanted to. It was a.n on-ooming car, which I didn't want 
to be in his path either. I pulled over further, and-I don't 
know-lost control; g·ot excited, or something, and ran up 
on the sidewalk. After hitting the first two people, well, I 
was nearly all to pieces. I didn't apply the brakes at all. I 
didn't try, because I was just excited. When I did get my-
self together, I was on the southwest corner-yes, the south-
west corner, and I stopped the truck and got out, and started 
back to see what damage I did. At that time two officers 
were there at the scene, themselves. 
Q. One of the officers says that he considered you had becu 
drinking. Had you been drinking¥ 
A. Not that day. 
Q. Was there anything· in connection with your job that 
took you across town to this place t 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What instructions did you have from your employers 
about leaving your route? 
A. To go to Transit Mixed, take the tire off the Ford 
truck, return it to the garage, fix it, and take it back to Tran-
sit Mixed. 
Q. Did you have any general instructions about 
page 36 ~ leaving your route when you went out on a job! 
A. Yes, sir, I have had instructions. 
Q. What were they? 
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A. To go where I was supposed to go, and return back to 
the garage. 
Q. Were you permitted, or forbidden, to go off the route 
for any purpose f 
A. I was forbidden to go off my route for any purpose. 
Q. Did you have permission, or were you forbidden, to take 
riders on the truck? 
A. I was for bidden to take riders .on any of the trips. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Thorp: 
~ Q. How long had you been working· for Master Auto when 
this accident occurred 1 
A. At that time I had been working for about four months, 
but, before that I had worked about eight years. I left once, 
and then I had been back about four months. 
Q. Had they ever told you, when you found a sick man, 
or a hurt man, in the road, to leave him lying there, or take 
him where he ought to g·o f 
A. No, sir, they didn't tell me that. They just give me 
rules to attend to their business, and come back to the garag·e. 
Q. The case of this sick fellow with the hem-
pag·e 37 ~ orrhage, was an emergency, w·asn 't it f 
A. Not to them, but to me. I just felt I could 
do the person a favor. 
Q. It was an emergency? 
A. On my part, but not on their part. 
Q. And you thought it would be all right with them if you 
helped a sick man out? 
A. No, sir, I didn't have any thought about th~m at all. 
Q. You just did the natural thing for a man to do, finding 
a sick man on the street? 
A. I was disobeying orders, but I was taking a chance 
on it. 
Q. Nothing had ever been said to you about a sick man, or 
hurt manf 
A. No mo re than : don't carry any passengers on their 
equipment. That is -a rule: not to pick up anyone. They 
just said, "Don't pick up anybody.'' They didn't mention 
"sick" or "hurt." 
Mr. Thorp: If your Honor please, that is the plaintiff's 
case. 
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{ The jury retired from the court room.) 
1>age 38} Mr. Hughes: If your Honor please, as to the 
trend of the recent decisions on deviation and 
scope of duty, there seems to me there is hardly anything to 
argue here. 
The Court: Mr. Hughes, there have been so many of these 
cases in this court, all of them reversed, that I am not pre-
pared to say what the last one was. 
Mr. Hughes: I will discuss them, sir. 
The Court: I wish you would. 
Mr. Hug·hes: They have been getting stronger and stronger· 
for the defendant each time, beginning with the Phelps case. 
The Court: Just give me the most recent ones. 
( The motion was further argued by counsel.) 
The Court: Gentlemen, as I say, it is always a. troublesome 
question. It seems to me that the question here is whether at 
the time of the accident this man, or this driver, was engaged 
in the work of his employer, and I am inclined to think that 
he was. He was returning from where lie should not have 
been, but he was taking that tire back to the Master Auto 
Service Corporation. It seems to me he was engaged in their 
duties at the time of the happening of the accident. For that 
reason I overrule your motion, and you can note your excep-
tion. 
:Mr. Hug·hes: Yes, sir. 
page 39 } (The jury returned to the courtroom.) 
JACK GREEN, 
called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, having been 
first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr. Hughes: 
Q. You are Mr. Jack Green? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Wlrnt is your connection with the defendant in this case, 
t11e Master Auto Service Corporation f 
A. I am part owner of the Master Auto Service. 
Q. Are you an official of any sort t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What? 
A. Secretary and vice-president of Master Auto Service. 
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Q. How long· has that company been doing business here, 
and how long have you been connected with it f 
A. It has been doing business since 1920, and I have been 
connected with it ever since. 
Q. You have been connected with it during that period? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know Levi Powell who was clri ving the truck in 
this case! 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 40 ~ Q. Have you been in court and heard the testi-
mony? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Please tell the jury what instructions the drivers of the 
trucks have when they are sent out on a joM 
A. The driver of each and every truck have instructions 
to make their calls and return immediately upon the same 
route that they went, and also not to pick up any riders nt 
any time. They are also instructed in meetings and bulletins 
that are handed out. It is a known fact that these instruc-
tions are that they are not to go off their routes, or not to 
pick up any riders, and to come back immediately, particu-
larly, when a call is made where you have to pick up a ti re, 
repair it, and return it, whereby a vehicle is waiting for this 
particular tire. In this particular case here, it was an inside 
tire on duals, and the truck could not ha~e gone on this road 
unless he had this tire back. He was instructed to come back 
immediately. 
Q. Within what time would Levi ordinarily have gotten 
back from this jobf 
A. Ordinaiily he should have been back inside of thirty 
minutes--there and back with the tire. 
Q. You did not ha.ve anything to do with sending him out, 
I believe, on this occasion Y 
A. Not on this occasion. 
Q. You had no personal knowledge of his going 
page 41 ~ out on this occasion? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Had you seen him this day before he went out on this 
assignment? 
A. Yes, sir, when he first came in; tlJat i8, at two o'clock 
he checked in, and I spoke to him. 
Q. Did you observe him at that time to see whether he 
seemed to be in a normal condition, or not? 
A. He seemed to be in a very normal condition. He 8poke 
to me and smiled like he usually does. 
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Q. Did he show any indication of having· had a drink, or 
anything of that sorU 
A. No, sir. If he did, he would not have worked. I would 
now allow him to work if he had a drink. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Thorp: 
Q. Mr. Green, did you ever give your drivers any instruc-
tions as to what to do if they found an injured man, or sick 
man, on the street¥ 
A. The instructions are for them not to pick anyone np, 
regardless of who they may be. 
Q. You mean to say that yo·u would not reprove a dl'iver 
if he found Mr. Hughes here injured in an automobile acci-
dent and did not take him to the hospital? 
pag·e 42 ~ A. I would not objoot to it if he was found in-
jured. 
WILLIAM F. LYLE, 
called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, having been 
first duly sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by Mr .. Hughes: 
Q. You are Mr. William F. Lyle! 
A. That is right. 
Q. And you are assistant service manag·er of the Master 
Auto Service Company? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been in that service·t 
A. Two years and a half. 
Q. What are your duties as assistant service manager, gen-
erally speaking? 
A. To take care of the service business. We have sales 
and service features in our organization, and mine is mainly 
in regard to calls for flat tires, wrecks, and so forth, on the 
highway, and general mec~anical service around the lot. 
Q. You have been here m the courtroom and have heard 
the testimony? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Including :M:r. Green's testimony? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 43 ~ Q. As assistant service manager, within what 
time do you think Powell would ordinarily have 
gotten back to the shop after g·oing for t.bis tire! 
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· A. If he had applied himself diligently to the job, he could 
have been back there in fifteen or twenty minutes. If he had 
done it in an indifferent way, half an hour would have been 
sufficient. 
Q. How did you rate him among· your men as to whether 
he was diligent or not? 
A. He was regarded as a very good employee who paid at-
tention to what he was doing. 
Q. What instructions did the truck drivers have with refer-
ence to what they should do when they went out on an assign-
ment of that sort f 
A. All drivers had blanket instructions, issued at meetings 
held at various times throughout the year, to proceed directly 
over the most direct route to the point at which they were 
sent, and return over the same route. 
Q. Did they have any instructions about riders? 
A. They were all instructed not to pick up riders along 
the route. 
Q. You sent Levi out on this occasion t 
.A. I did. 
Q. Did you have opportunity, or occasion, to observe him 
before you sent him out? 
page 44 ~ A. I did. I rang the bell, and he answered the 
bell. vVe have a bell in a remote part of the shop 
where the men usually congregate when they are not busy, 
or active. I rang the bell, and he came in response to the 
ring. He walked at least thirty feet towards me at the time, 
and he seemed to be perfectly normal in his approach. He 
came to a stop directly across the counter from me-just a 
narrow counter, possibly about thirty inches wide-and I had 
ample opportunity to observe him. There was no indication 
of anything other than normal. 
Q. If he had had anything to drink, would you have had 
an opportunity to ascertain it? 
A. I could easily have smelled it, because he was not over 
thirty inches, or three feet, a.way at that time, at the most. 
I gave him a copy of this service call, which was to the Tran-
sit Mixed Concrete Corporation at 434 West York Street. I 
put it in the time-clock and punched it out at 2 :55. 
Q. That means he went out with that assignment at 2 :55? 
A. He immediately took the truck key, which I banded him 
at that time, and left. 
Q. Describe to the jury the routine of those slips. vVhat 
handwriting·s appear on that slip, if more than one f 
A. The address is in the handwriting· of the telephone op-
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erator, a girl who takes the call over the phone. It was taken 
at 2 :45 P. M. After she takes them, they are writ-
page 45 } ten up in three copies, and she hands the original 
and the second copy to me. I, in turn, dispatch the 
man and give him the original, punching the time in the time-
clock when he leaves the place. 
Q. The one you hold in your hand is the original? 
A. That is the original. The pink copy-the second copy 
-I punch the time on that, and attach it to a hook under 
which the truck key hangs. The trucks are numbered. At 
the same time that I punch the clock, I writ the truck num-
ber in the proper space at the bottom of the sheet, and the 
service man who was sent on the call. 
Q. This one that you hold in your hand went out with Levi 
Powell on this jobt 
A. Yes, sir. The writing on the bottom there is: "Truck 
No. 4, service man Levi.'' I just put his first name down. 
That is in my handwriting. 
Q. You are the one who punched the time'? 
A. I punched the time, yes, sir. 
Q. Ordinarily, if he had come on back with this tire, in-
stead of going· across town, what would have happened to 
this slip! 
A. He would have turned it in to me, and, from this slip, I 
would have made an invoice charging the Transit Mixed Con-
crete Company with the tire repaired. 
Q. As a matter of fact, since he did not come 
page 46 ~ back, what happened to the slip 1 
A. As I say, the second copy is hung-
Q. No. I mean, tbis original? 
A. This was found in the truck after the accident. 
Q. I believe you said the longest time allowance that would 
have been accorded him on this job would have been half an 
hour? 
A. That would have been ample, even if he had taken his 
time. 
Q. I believe you have made some measurements at my re-
quest of the distances? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did Levi go with you and show you the point where he 
left his route, and how he went? 
A. Yes, sir. Levi traveled the same route which he says 
he took the clay of the accident. 
Q. And from the point of departure at York and Bote~ 
tourt, out to the point of the accident, how far was it? 
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A. One an_d eight-tenths miles. 
Q. Taking· a direct line from his regular route, which would 
have been up Colonial ... \ venue, taking a direct line from the 
nearest point on Colonial Avenue out to the point of the ac-
cident, how far is thatf 
A. One and two-tenths miles. 
Q. Did you get the blocks f 
pag·e 47 ~ A. Approximately seventeen blocks. 
Q. Seventeen blocks one way·? 
.A. •. Yes, sii-. 
Q. Twice seventeen blocks for the round trip¥ 
A. That is right. 
Q. One and two-ten tbs miles one way f 
A. Yes, sir, just one way. 
:Mr. Hughes: That is all. 
Mr. Thorp: No questions. 
Mr. Hughes: I wish to mark this service sheet in eviclcnee,. 
and circulate it among the jury, as ''Defendant's Ex11ihit 
No. 1". 
(The paper was marked and filed in ·evidence as "Defend-
ant's Exhibit No. 1 ".) 
CORNELIUS WILLARD, 
called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, having been 
first duly sworn, testified as follows : . 
Examined by Mr. Hughes: 
Q. You are :Mr. Cornelius Willard? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. You are employed at the Ha1l garage? 
page 48 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have been in court and have heard this 
testimony? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. " 7 ere ~vou, at the time of this accident, employed at tlrn 
Master Auto Service Companyf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you go out a part of the ·way witI1 Levi when he 
went on this trip? 
A. Yes, sir. I was leaving Station No. 1, and was g·oing-
homc to my luncl1, and then I was g·oing to Station No. 2, to 
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g·o to work at four o'clock. I rode with him from Station 
No. 1 at Colonial Avenue, up to Fairfax and Botetourt. 
Q. Station No. 1 is at Colonial and 20th Streets f 
A. That is correct. 
Q. That is where he went out from on the job! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You went with him as far as Fairfax Avenue t 
A. Fairfax and Botetourt. 
Q. Did you sit on the seat with him T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was there anything· abnormal, in any way, about his 
condition Y 
A. He was in perfect condition. 
Q. If he bad been drinking, would you have had an op-
portunity to discover it Y 
page 49 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Hug·hes: That is all. 
Mr. Thorp: No question. 
WILLIAM F. LYLE, 
being recalled, further testified as follows: 
·Examined by Mr. Hughes: 
Q. Is Levi Powell now in the employ of Master Auto Serv-
ice? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How long ago did he leave, and where is be now 1 
A. He left about ten days ago-a week or ten days ago-
and he is now with the Lee Tire Company. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Thorp: 
Q. Your company continued to employ him up until about 
ten days ago 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Hughes: 
Q. And he left voluntarily T 
A. He left voluntarily. 
page 50 ~ Mr. Hughes: That is our case, sir. 
l\fr. Thorp: No further witnesess. 
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( The jury retired from the courtroom.) 
Mr. Hughes: If your Honor please, I wish to repeat my 
motion to strike the evidence. I suppose it will be useless 
to argue it further, in view of the ground on which your Honor 
based your decision. I would like, however, to make this com-
ment on that ground: It seems to me that the fact he made 
this deviation with this tire rather emphasizes, than other-
wise, the fact of departing from his duty. 
The Court: I will overrule your motion, and you can note 
your exception. 
Mr. Hughes: Yes, sir. vVe except to your overruling it 
both times. 
Stipulation: It is stipulated between counsel that if Levi 
Powell were recalled to the stand, he would testify that his 
speed, as he approached the scene of the accident, was be,.. 
tween eighteen and twenty miles an hour. 
(The jury returned to the courtroom.) 
page 51 ~ INSTRUCTIONS. 
:Mr. Hughes: The defendant excepts to the giving· of all 
instructions granted plaintiff, on the same ground assigned 
for defendant's two motions to strike the evidence. If the 
defendant had prevailed in either of said motions, then, none 
of the instructions given could have been given. 
In this connection the defendant reasserts its position that 
it clearly appears from the evidence, as a matter of law, that 
at the time of the accident the driver of the defendant's truck 
was not engag·ed in his master's business, but in a matter 
wholly unrelated thereto, both geographically and in subject 
matter. 
On the same ground, or grounds, the defendant excepts to 
the refusal of Instruction D as asked for by the clef endant, 
and refused by the Court. 
Plailntiff's Instruction P-1 (Granted): 
'' The Court instructs the jury that it was the duty of Levi 
.Powell while operating the truck of the defendai1t alon2' 
Princess Anne Road on the day of the alleged accident, t'o 
use ordinary ca.re: 
"(1) To keep said truck at all times under reasonable con-
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page 52 ~ accelerator with which the same was equipped. 
'' (2) To obser\:'."e and obey the provisions of such 
traffic laws as were then in force reg·ulating the rate of speed 
of motor vehicles on Princess Anne Road at or near the in-
tersection of ,,Tide Street. 
'' And if the jury believe from the evidence that the said 
Levi Powell failed to use ordinary care to perform any one 
or all of the foregoing· duties, and that by reason thereof the 
car which he was driving left the driveway. of said street 
and ran partially or wholly upon the sidewalk and struck the 
plaintiff while he was either standing or walking on said side-
walk, then the said Levi Powell was guilty of negligence; and 
if the jury further believe from the evidence under the other 
instructions in this case that said Levi Powell was at the time 
of the accident engaged in and about the business of the de-
fendant, and that such negligence was the proximate cause 
of the injury complained of, they should find for the plain-
tiff.,,. 
Pla.intiff 's lnstritction P-2 (Granted): 
"The Court instructs the jury that the fact that a pedes-
trian on a sidewalk is struck hv an automobile which has 
been driven upon the sidewalk raises a presumption that the 
automobile operator was negligent, and places the burden on 
the def enda11t. of proving want of neglig·ence.'' 
page 53 ~ Plai,ntiff 's Instruction P-3 (Granted): 
"The Court instructs the jury that if they find for the 
plaintiff in estimating his damages you should consider any 
physical and mental pain which you believe from the evi-
dence he has suffered, if any, as a natural result of the in-
juries, and also any permanent injury which you may believe 
from the evidence he has sustained, and if you believe 
from the evidence that he was permanently injured he has 
a right to recover prospective as well as past damages. In 
determining the past damages you may take into considera-
tion any loss sustained by him by reason of being unable to 
attend to his ordinary business and affairs by reason of said 
accident, and also any expense for medical treatment, hos-
J)italization, medicines, made necessary by the injuries com-
plained of in this action, and assess his damages at such sum 
as you think just and proper under the evidence in this case."' 
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Plaintiff's Instruction P-4 (Refused): 
"The Court further instructs the jury that the provisions 
of the traffic laws of the State of Virg·inia prohibit the op-
eration in a business district of a motor vehicle at a speed in 
excess of :fifteen miles an hour.'' 
Defendant's lnstniction A (Granted): 
'' The burden is upon the plaintiff, before he can 
page 54 ~ recover, to prove by a. p1·eponderance of the testi-
mony some negligence on the part of the defend-
ant which was the sole proximate cause of the injury to plain-
tiff. If you believe from the evidence tllat the plaintiff has 
failed to meet that burden of proof, then he cannot recover." 
Defendant's lnstrnction B (Granted): 
"Even if you believe Powell's presence at Wide Street 
was in the course of his employment, yet, 
"If you believe from the evidence that the driver of the 
defendant's truck was suddenly confronted with an emer-
gency created without fault on his part by an automobile 
parked at the curb suddenly leaving its parked position with-
out warning and coming into his lane of traffic, then the law 
does not require of defendant's driver all of the presence of 
mind and care of an ordinarily prudent person under or-
dinary circumstances, but makes allowance for such emer-
gency and its reaction on the truck driver's mind, nerves and 
muscles. The law does not hold a person acting in such 
emergency responsible for errors of judgment, even if the 
course be takes to escape therefrom is an unwise one, and 
some other course which he might have taken might have 
avoided the accident. 
"If you b~lieve from the evidence that defendant's drive1· 
was confronted with such emergency, and acted as an 01·-
dinarily prudent person might have done under 
page 55 ~ the same or similar circumstances, then the defend-
ant, Master Auto Service Corporation, is not re-
sponsible for any injuries that the plaintiff may have sus-
tained under the circumstances. Before the plaintiff can re-
cover you must believe from. a preponderance of the evidence 
that the act of defendant's driver in such emergency was such 
that it could not reasonably be said that a man of ordinarv 
prudence under similar circumstances might not have acte~l 
HS he did." 
I 
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Defendant's lnst,r-uction C (Granted): 
'' The :Master Auto Ser~ice Corporation is not liable for any 
act on the part of its truck driver, Levi Powell, unless such 
act was in the course of his employment. If the act occurred 
while the driver was pursuing his own ends, the defendant 
is not liable. If the servant step aside from his master's 
business, for however short a time, to do an act not connected 
with such business, the relation of master and servant is for 
the time suspended. If the defendant's injuries resulted from 
such a situation, he cannot recover and you must find for the 
defendant.'' 
Defendant's lnstr1tction D (Refused): 
"If you believe from the evidence that on the afternoon 
of the accident in suit the defendant's truck driver Levi Pow-
ell was on his way back to defendant's place of business 
at Colonial Avenue and 20th Street from a service 
page 56 ~ assignment at the plant of the Transit Mixed Con-
crete Corporation, at the west end of York Street; 
that at the corner of York and Botetourt he picked up a sick 
stranger and left his route to carrv said stranger to his desti-
nation east of Church Street, and that this was a personal 
mission of no interest to his employer, the defendant, then 
the plaintiff cannot recover for injuries caused by. any act of 
negligence on the part of said truck driver while he was thus 
deviating· from his route. And this is true even though you 
may believe from the evidence that the said Levi Powell was 
negligent and that his negligence was the sole proximate cause 
of the plaintiff's injuries." 
page 57 ~ JUDGE'S CERTIFICATE. 
I~ A. R. Haneke}, Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk, Virginia, who presided over the foregoing· trial of 
the case of Cledious M. Bowden 'V, Master Auto Service Cor-
poration, nt Norfolk, Virg·inia, ]\fay 20, 1941, do certify that 
the foregoing, together with the exhibits therein referred to, 
is a true and correct copy and report of all the evidence to-
gether wit]1 all the motions, objections, and exceptions on the 
part of the respective parties; and all other incidents of the 
said trial of the said cause, with the motions, ohjections and 
exeeptions of the respective parties as therein set forth. A8 
to the origfoal exhibits introduced in evidence, as shown hy 
the foregoing report, to-wit: Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 (hospital 
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bill), Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 (small plat), and Defendant's Ex-
hibit 1 (service sheet), which hav:e been initialed by me for 
the purpose- of identification, it is agreed by the plaintiff and 
the clefencJant that they shall be transmitted to the Supreme 
Court of· Appeals as part of the record in this cause in lieu 
of certifying to the said Court copies of said exhibits . 
. And I do further certify that the attorney for the plain-
tiff had reasonable notice, in writing, given by counsel fo1· 
the defendant, of the time and place when the foregoing re-
port of the testimony, exhibits, and other incidents 
page 58 ~ of the trial would be tendered and presented to 
the undersigned for signature and authentication, 
and that the said report was presented to me on the 15 clay 
of J u]y, HJ4 l, within less than sixty days after the entry of 
the final judgment in said cause. 
Given under my hand this 15 day of July, 1941. 
ALLAN R. HANCKEL, 
Judg·e of the Circuit Court of the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia. 
pag-e 59 r CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk of the Circuit Court of tbe 
City of Norfolk, Virginia, do hereby certify that the foreg·oing· 
is a copy and report of the testimony and other incidents of 
the trial in the case of Cledious M. Bowden v. l\faster Auto 
Service Corporation, and that the original thereof and said 
copy together with the original exhibits, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 
(hospital bill), Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 (small plat), and De-
fendant's ·Exhibit 1 ( service sheet), therein referred to, duly 
authenticated by the J udg·e of said Court, were lodged and 
filed with me as Clerk of said Court on the 15th day of July, 
1941. 
CECIL M. ROBERTSON, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Oitv 
of Norfolk Virginia. ,, 
By W. R. HANCKEL, D. C. 
page 60 ~ Virginia : 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City of 
N orfo]k, on the 15th day of .July, in the year, 1941. 
I~ Cecil M. Robertson. Clerk of the Circuit Court of tlw 
City of Norfolk, do certify that the foregoing is a true tran-
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script of the record in the suit of Cledious :M. Bowden, plain-
tiff, a,gainst Master Auto Service Corporation, defendant, 
lately pending in said Court. 
I further certify that the same was not made up and com-
pleted and delivered until the plaintiff had received due notice 
thereof in writing, and of the intention of the defendant to 
apply to the Supreme Comt of Appeals of Virginia for a writ 
of error and supersedeas to the judgment therein. 
Teste: 
CECIL l\L ROBERTSON, Clerk. 
By SUE B. GOFORTH, D. C. 
Pee for Transcript, $15.50. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. vVATTS, C. C. 
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